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I. Origins of Corporate Personality

Abstract
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s controversial
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, then-President Obama declared in
his 2010 State of the Union Address that the
Court had “reversed a century of law” in
overturning limitations on independent corporate
expenditures. In one sense, this is clearly true.
The Tillman Act, passed in 1907 at the urging of
Theodore Roosevelt, marked the first legislative
attempt to limit the influence of corporations in
political elections.
In a larger sense, however, Citizens United
served as the culmination of two hundred years
of jurisprudence defining the rights of the
corporate person. Starting from the ancient
origins of corporate personality, this project
traces the bases for Citizens United through a
series of landmark cases, from Chief Justice
Marshall’s famous description of the corporation
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodard
(1819) to the twin pillars of Buckley v. Valeo
(1976) and First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti (1978). Further, in doing so, it seeks to
demonstrate that the standards established in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990)
were rightly overturned in Citizens United, as
said standards were fundamentally out-of-step
with the principles of corporate rights and First
Amendment protection outlined by the Court in
centuries prior.

• Artificial personhood: The idea of operating
under a collective identity has origins as old as
ancient Assyria but first took hold in Roman law.1
The term persona ficta was later coined by Pope
Innocent IV in his canonization of the law on the
Roman collegia, which he observed had been
able to swear oaths on their own behalf.2
• Perpetual life: Inspired by the use of a similar
tactic by Athenian religious associations,3 the
idea of distinct personhood was borrowed and
combined with the notion of perpetual life by the
English medieval church as a mechanism to
maintain its property while still preserving some
control over the church body, after the death of
church leadership.4
• Limited liability: The risks and capital-intensive
nature of mercantilism during the colonial era
ensured that the only way to raise the necessary
funds was to ensure investors some protection.5

II. Rights of the Corporate Person
• Dartmouth College marked the first expansive
judicial attempt to define the corporation, holding
it to be “an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being
the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it either expressly or as incidental
to its very existence.”6
• In the first corporate 14th Amendment case,
corporations were determined not to be subject
to the Privileges and Immunities Clause.7
• In a flurry of Gilded Age cases, corporations were
determined to have equal protection,8 due
process,9 and search and seizure rights10 but not
a right against self-incrimination11 nor a part in
the 14th Amendment right to liberty.12
• Pierce clarified this lack of a corporate right to
liberty to allow for cases involving the “business
and property for which they claim protection.”13

Conclusion
Contrary to the insistences of its
detractors, Citizens United marked a
faithful return to a longstanding trend in
jurisprudence of protecting those rights of
the corporate person “confer[red] upon” or
“incidental to its very existence” Speech,
even beyond any immediate interest in
preserving property, is one such incidental
right, and, as confirmed by Buckley, said
speech may, in some cases, take the form
of independent campaign expenditures.

References
1.

2.

III. First Amendment Corporate Speech
• By the 1930s, it was clear that the freedom of the
press also belonged to the corporate press.14
• Shortly thereafter, it was made clear that the
freedoms of speech and press were reserved
even for non-citizens. 15
• During the Civil Rights Era, the NAACP, as a
corporation, successfully defended its right to
association.16
• Bellotti declared explicitly that corporations have
a 1st Amendment right to protected speech.
Notably, the Court added that it could find no
support “for the proposition that speech that
otherwise would be within the protection of the
First Amendment loses that protection simply
because its source is a corporation that cannot
prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material
effect on its business or property.”17
• However, Bellotti’s footnote 26 left open the
possibility that “Congress might well be able to
demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or
apparent corruption in independent expenditures
by corporations to influence candidate
elections,” without otherwise approaching the
question itself.18

IV. Independent Campaign Expenditures
• The first three occasions corporate (or union)
campaign expenditures came before the Court,
the Court avoided the question, deciding each
case on narrower grounds.19
• Buckley subtly introduced the idea that political
campaign-related expenditures were a form of
speech, drawing from a judicial tradition of
considering various activities as speech
equivalents.20
• In doing so, Buckley struck down limits on
independent expenditures—but although
corporations were parties to the case, it did not
explicitly decide the corporate question.21
• A decade later, the Court invalidated restrictions
on independent expenditures for a narrow set of
non-profit corporate entities.22
• However, in Austin, the Court opted to uphold
limits on for-profit corporations’ independent
expenditures, citing the “state-conferred
advantages of the corporate structure” and the
potential for corruption.23 This reasoning was
later echoed in McConnell.24
• In 2010, the Court in Citizens United overturned
Austin, citing the line of precedent prior to it.25
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